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Conclusion 
Daniel G. Zirker 
Two critical points are highlighted in this examination of what we have 
chosen to call "quasi-ethnic identities" in military establishments: First, that 
although the emergence of this phenomenon has been, at best, gradual and 
incomplete, it has been increasingly aided by a global learning cwve; and 
second, that its goal or strategy, the strengthening of military autonomy and 
bargaining power, includes the further isolation and alienation of the military 
from mainstream society, and hence from democratic practices. As to the 
first point, information exchange is now so rapid and so pervasive that even a 
relatively remote military establishment such as that of Guinea or Suriname 
can be fully aware within hours of developments in "military organizational 
engineering" across the globe. Of the cases in this volume, only Guinea, 
Tanzania and Algeria have fully established independently "invented" mili­
tary cultures, the "quasi-ethnicities" that are the subject of this book. Of 
those, only Guinea has thus far been able to use its development to establish a 
largely separate, autonomous and independent military organization for pur­
poses of bargaining, and maintaining a unified military position, and been 
able to maintain a relatively healthy budget and avoid the civil wars, albeit 
through a protracted military dictatorship, that have beset all of its West 
African neighbors. 
The invention of a quasi-ethnic identity in the Tanzanian People's De­
fence Force (TPDF), while rapid and impressive, served primarily as a van­
guard model for the implanting of a national ethnic identity such that, by the 
1990s, it became the single national, and apparently enduring, ethnic identity 
of Tanzania. 1 The Algerian military quasi-ethnic invention, on the other 
hand, has primarily served the interests of a narrow, civil-military elite, rath­
er than as the quasi-ethnic identity of a relatively autonomous and indepen­
dent corporate military establishment. Each of the other examples-Kenya, 
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Nigeria, Suriname and Uganda-has evinced contrasting manifestations of 
traditional, or semi-traditional, and periodically changing ethnic balancing of 
one sort or another, and these military establishments have struggled to move 
into the next paradigm, the era of quasi-ethnic identities, as much as they 
have periodically seemed to strive to do so. 
Second, in the so-called "third wave of democratization,"2 military con­
scription is rapidly disappearing, and increased professionalization and the 
isolation of military institutions is increasingly the norm. In deeply divided 
societies in the developing world, the recruitment of qualified officer candi­
dates often implies the exclusion, and hence social marginalization, of se­
lected, "less developed" traditional ethnic groups, and when this is coupled 
with the concentration in a national officer corps of nationally scarce exper­
tise, this may intensify the privation of those underdeveloped ethnic groups 
from one of the key concomitants of national development in many deeply 
divided countries, the benefits of civic action projects3 conducted by the 
"national" military establishment. With the common absence of one or more 
of the major traditional ethnic groups among the officer corps, charges of 
bias and neglect of those ethnic regions necessarily follows. An independent 
military culture, one that is verifiably and demonstrably "national," if only 
because it is not linked to a traditional ethnic interest, is the only possible 
inoculation to this kind of predictable crisis. 
Even with a careful blend of traditional ethnic groups in the officer corps 
and enlisted ranks, the lot of most military establishments in deeply plural 
societies seems to be one of political and social isolation. An examination of 
African military establishments, for example, almost immediately points to 
their isolation based upon recent colonial heritage, persisting colonial mili­
tary customs, internal ethnic struggles within the military, and the frequent 
manipulation of the armed fdrces by civilian elites. Again, the only potential 
antidote to these maladies, although not without its threat to civil society, 
involves the development within the military institution of an independent 
cultural identity, and the transformation of the military institution into a kind 
of cultural "melting pot," where officers, in particular, are able "to lose some 
of their regional or tribal characteristics. "4 In this interpretation, the officers' 
mess might be used to encourage "a sense of exclusiveness." As William 
Gutteridge notes, the threat of this close identification among officers is 
immediately apparent. It involves fostering a "club-like atmosphere ..  in 
which conspiracy can flourish."5 One can easily see how this would begin to 
overcome traditional ethnic barriers within the officer corps, at a potentially 
drastic cost. 
Conspiracies are legion among junior officers in deeply divided societies, 
however. The basis of "conspiracy" in such cases tends to be either tradition­
al ethnic attachments, or rank-on-rank, where the higher ranks have been 
carefully selected by political elites, and the lower ranks are desperately 
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seeking alliances. The traditional bases of most of these rank-based alliances, 
in turn, are ... traditionally ethnic. Traditional ethnic attachments, in fact, 
hold the key to most successful coup conspiracies and, later, to their down­
fall. The development of a single quasi-ethnic military identity could begin to 
attenuate at least these bases of critical alliances. Inter-rank conspiracies 
would remain a possibility, of course, but one critical and potentially debili­
tating source of such alliances might be replaced. It is a prospect that no 
modernizing military establishment can afford to ignore. 
What of the long-tenn threats that are posed to civil society by military 
establishments in deeply plural societies that are able to adopt their own 
unique quasi-ethnic identities and thereby set themselves apart from the va­
garies of traditional ethnic identities? These appear to be significant. A new 
ethnic, or quasi-ethnic, group with the legitimate exercise of force, heavily 
armed, endowed with a sense of corporate unity and a mission to guard 
national security, according to their own definition, would appear to trump 
all other players in an ethno-political competition for resources and power. If 
one were to add a relatively low regard for democratic practices and human 
rights, the prospect of a newly developed military quasi-ethnic identity is a 
frightening one indeed. Nevertheless, its development in many military es­
tablishments would be linked to institutional survival, particularly as the 
orthodox military raison d'etre, defense of the borders against a foreign 
military incursion, gradually disappeared, and civilian authorities increasing­
ly questioned the need to have a military establishment in the first place. 6 
These arguments are commonplace in the neo-liberal "new world order," and 
countries like Panama and Costa Rica have existed for decades without the 
threat or cost of military establishments. Will military institutions in deeply 
divided societies continue to tolerate this lightly veiled threat to their survi­
val? 
The case studies in this volume have compared and contrasted military 
establishments at various stages in the recognition and development of their 
own institutional identities. Some of them, Guinea, Tanzania, Algeria, and 
perhaps Suriname, have manifested quasi-ethnic identities that have put them 
at odds, at least initially and in different ways, with traditional ethnic groups 
in their countries. The Ugandan, Kenyan and Nigerian military establish­
ments have experienced varying forms of traditional ethnic balancing in their 
respective officer corps. In each case, however, the national military institu­
tion was pressured by the changing ethno-politics of a newly independent 
country and, except in the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, responded with 
intervention and/or violence. 
Mamadou Bab's chapter on Guinea is an exploration of a rich question: 
Why has Guinea not suffered from the bloody civil wars that have affected 
virtually all of its West African neighbors? His analysis points to Guinea's 
separate military identity as a primary, if not exclusive, explanation. Ibikunle 
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Adeakin examines Nigeria, one of Guinea's neighbors and a strongly 
contrasting case study. Nigeria is a survivor of sub-Saharan Africa's first 
major ethnically-based civil war, the Biafran conflict. He traces the coups of 
1966, the removal of the lgbo officers, the accession to, and retention of 
power by the Hausa-Fulani generals, and the isolation and eventual defeat of 
the Igbo secession attempt. He explores the military handover of power to 
civilians in 1999 and their surprising difficulties in dealing with Boko Har­
am, a northern-based (Hausa-Fulani) Muslim terrorist group, and speculates 
as to the possible ethnic and political motives. 
My own chapter contrasting the cases of Tanzania and Uganda, and 
Thomas Stubbs's chapter on Kenya take these three very closely linked East 
African cases and underscore their vastly different outcomes. Uganda and 
Kenya, British East Africa, have had relatively few, highly competitive eth­
nic groups, while Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania), German East Africa 
prior to WWI, and a British protectorate thereafter, had over 120 mostly non­
competitive groups. All three countries experienced a military mutiny at the 
dawn of their independence, the East African mutiny of December 1963, and 
each of these countries handled it differently. Kenya was not quite indepen­
dent, and allowed British military units to step in. Later it would carefully 
balance its officer corps with the ruling (usually Kikuyu) ethnicity, while 
keeping the military out of politics. Uganda, rotating and balancing tradition­
al ethnic identities in the officer corps, acceded to the pay and promotion 
demands of the mutineers, and experienced a violent coup and disastrous 
military dictatorship seven years later. The military has long played a key 
role in maintaining the power of presidents, always via the ethnic balancing 
of senior officers. Tanzania completely disestablished its branch of the neo-
• colonial army, implanting a new military force based on a lingua franca, 
Swahili, and a strong commitml'ftlt to a socialist view of national develop­
ment, with a view to using it as a vanguard agency to promote a new, unified 
national culture. Today, none of the three countries can be described as 
having established a quasi-ethnic military identity for the purpose of estab­
lishing an independent and autonomous institution, although Tanzania came 
the closest. 
Algeria created perhaps the purest independent military identity based 
upon a faulty image of its revolution. In reality, as Yassine Belkamel's chap­
ter illustrates, a profound Thermidor in the Algerian revolution had led to the 
assassination or exile of most of its radical revolutionary leaders, and a group 
of opportunistic, reactionary, French-trained officers who had spent roost of 
the revolution fighting on the side of the French, and only crossed over in the 
waning hours of the fight to take up leadership positions on the margins of 
the revolutionary struggle, were able very gradually to "Arabize" and secu­
larize the military culture by capturing key politicians and maintaining the 
military institution in power in their own interests. After the first democratic 
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elections in the late 1980s, it was this group, the "French Officers," that 
launched their bid for absolute power via a bloody coup, and a civil war that 
has cost as many as two hundred thousand lives. They have subsequently 
ruled Algeria through the military establishment and its quasi-ethnic culture, 
using figurehead presidents and reportedly rigged elections. Suriname, on a 
much smaller scale, has maintained a unique military culture based loosely of 
Dutch military culture and governed by the criminal mentality of a charis­
matic leader, Desi Bouterse. As Paulo Gustavo Pellegrino Correa notes in his 
chapter, the development of an independent and autonomous military iden­
tity can serve as a shield for criminal activity in this new, neo-liberal global 
environment. Again, opportunism and instrumentalism are the best explana­
tions of the development of a quasi-ethnic military identity in Suriname. 
At the heart of this book is a basic question common to all institutions, 
one that was perhaps best phrased in the title of Herbert Kaufman's now­
classic work, Are Government Organizations Jmmorta/? 1 Kaufman's work 
did demonstrate that most government institutions, at least in the United 
States, tend to adapt to survive, that is, when facing a loss of mission and 
government support, they tend to change their clientele and their mission 
precisely in order to maintain a budget and . . survive. TI1is is reminiscent of 
the motives discussed in this volume for the development of a military quasi­
ethnic identity, particularly when placed in a contemporary historical con­
text. 
With the end of the Cold War, and the phantasmagoric concept of the 
"peace dividend," attention turned to the hundreds of national annies that 
continued to draw scarce national resources in a world of debt and hunger ... 
and the relatively few cases of "orthodox" military missions, that is, of inva­
sions of national borders by neighboring countries. Indeed, when Tanzania 
invaded Uganda in 1979, it was said to have been the first time in modem 
African history that one independent African country had invaded and occu­
pied another. While Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) have increased dra­
matically in this new world of cultural conflict, this fundamental question 
remains: Are military establishments really necessary in their current num­
bers and distribution? 
Our book does not address this question. Rather, it examines the way in 
which military establishments are increasingly dodging it, removing them­
selves from civilian pressures, the internal disputes of traditional ethnic an­
tagonisms, the external disputes of national ethno-politics, and even budge­
tary disputes to which a divided and dependent institution is so vulnerable. 
An ethnically homogeneous anny in an age of ethno-politics will always be a 
formidable bargaining agent, however. In the final analysis, annies have a 
legitimate monopoly of violence, and they have guns, a powerful combina­
tion. 
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NOTES 
1 .  A possible caveat here involves the separate culture of the tiny "countJy" of Zanzibar, a 
late addition to Tan1.11nia, and still accorded a separate culture as part of its "confederal'' 
stmcture . 
2. Samuel P. H1mtington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: Univeristy of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 
3. Engineering and technology projects, medical assistance, disaster relief, etc. 
4. William Gutteridge, "Military Elites in Ghana and Nigeria," African Forum 2 ( 1 966) : 
40. 
5. Gutteridge, "Military Elites," 40. 
6. Costa Rica disestablished its military by constitutional provision in 1953 after a bloody 
civil war, and Panama did so in the 1990s. Julius Nyerere, of Tanzania, pressed unsuccessfully 
for an African military force to replace African national armies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
7. Herbert Kaufman. Are Government Organizations Immortal? (Washington, DC: Brook­
ings Institution, 1976). 
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